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Abstract. “Symmetric secret”-based RFID systems are widely adopted
in supply chains. In such RFID systems, a reader’s ability to identify a
RFID tag relies on the possession of the tag’s secret which is usually
only known by its owner. If a “symmetric secret”-based RFID system
is deployed in third party logistics (3PL) supply chains, all the three
parties (the sender of the goods, the receiver of the goods and the 3PL
provider) should have a copy of those tags’ secrets to access the tags. In
case the three parties in 3PL supply chain are not all honest, sharing the
secrets among the three parties will cause security and privacy problems.
To solve these problems, we ﬁrstly formalize the security and privacy
requirements of RFID system for 3PL supply considering the existence
of the internal adversaries as well as the external adversaries. Then we
propose two diﬀerent protocols which satisfy the requirements, one is
based on aggregate massage authentication codes, the other is based
on aggregate signature scheme. Based on the comparisons of the two
protocols on performance and usability, we get the conclusion that overall
the aggregate MAC-based solution is more applicable in 3PL supply
chains.
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency IDentiﬁcation (RFID) technology is an automatic identiﬁcation
technology that uses radio waves (wireless) to transmit the messages. RFID sys-
tems consist of two main components: tags and readers. Tags are radio transpon-
ders attached to physical objects, while radio transceivers, or readers, query these
tags for identifying information about the objects to which tags are attached.
RFID technology, when combined with internet and networking technology, en-
ables product information to be collected, integrated, shared, and queried at
various levels (e.g., item, pallet, case and container) in real time in a supply
chain. Third party logistics (3PL) is one of the most dominating kind of supply
chains, it has been widely adopted by many companies. The companies out-
sources part or all of their supply chains to professional logistics service provider
to get better management eﬃciency and at same time reduce the cost.
RFID-based system’s high eﬃciency is due to the contactless identifying
property; however, this property also beneﬁts the potential adversaries. Ra-
dio transmits through open air, then an adversary can eavesdrop or interfere
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the communications between reader and tag without the awareness of the tag’s
owner. Dozens of cryptographic protocols have been proposed to provide secure
and private identiﬁcation and authentication of the tag (Sometimes the reader
authentication is also required), such as the “hash-lock” protocol of Weis et al.
[15], OSK protocol [11] of Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita, and the tree-based
protocol of Molnar et al. [10]. There are also many works [9,14] et al. deal with
the secure and private ownership transfer between two parties. Most of these so-
lutions for authentication and ownership transfer are “symmetric secret”-based
that an authorized reader shares a secret with each tag.
The “symmetric secret”-based solutions are designed to protect the system
against external adversaries who do not know the secrets. However, in 3PL supply
chains that three parties (the sender of the goods, the receiver of the goods and
the 3PL provider) are involved in the processing of the tags, internal adversaries
should be considered. In 3PL supply chains, all of the three parties need to access
the tags, hence all of them should have a copy of the secret when a “symmetric
secret”-based solution is deployed. With a tag’s secret, any party can fabricate the
tag. In case inside adversaries exist, disputes on the goods’ originality will be hard
to solve since all the three parties have the ability to fabricate the tags.
Currently, there does not exist any solution that is suitable for 3PL supply
chains considering the exitance of internal adversaries. It does not mean that
putting eﬀort on 3PL supply chains is not necessary. 3PL has large market
size, a study1 shows that in U.S. the 3PL market gross revenues reached $107.1
billion in 2009 and 8.3% growth is predicted for 2010. It is crucial to enhance
the security and privacy level of RFID-enabled system for 3PL supply chains.
We are the ﬁrst ones to work on this new direction. Our contributions can be
summarized as follows:
– We ﬁrstly formulate the security and privacy requirements of RFID system
for 3PL supply chains with respect to both the internal and external adver-
saries.
– To execute the authentication of the tags in 3PL supply chains without
revealing the secrets to the 3PL provider and the receiver of the goods,
we provide two solutions that enable the tags’ aggregate authentication on
batch level. One solution is based on an aggregate Message Authentication
Code(MAC), the other is based on an aggregate signature scheme.
Both the two solutions match the privacy and security requirements of 3PL
supply chains. The comparisons on performance and usability between the two
proposals show that the aggregate MAC-based solution is more applicable than
the aggregate signature-based solution in 3PL supply chains.
The Organization of this paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we model the 3PL supply chain and analyze the security and
privacy requirements, introduce the motivation of our work in details. In Section
1 http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-and-global-third-party-
logistics-market-analysis-is-released-94771894.html
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3 and Section 4, we respectively show our aggregate MAC-based solution and
aggregate signature-based solution as well as the analysis on security and privacy.
In Section 5, we compare the performance and usability of the two schemes. We
review the related work in Section 6 and ﬁnally conclude in Section 7.
2 Third Party Logistics Supply Chain
In this section, we provide a brief review of 3PL supply chain. Then, we provide
the attacking scenario of adversaries in 3PL supply chain and formulate the
security and privacy requirements for preventing these attacks.
2.1 3PL Supply Chain
We depict the model of 3PL supply chains in Figure 1. A 3PL supply chain
contains three parties. We denote the sender (customer A) who entrusts the
transportation of goods to a 3PL provider as Party A, the 3PL provider as Party
C and the receiver (customer B) of the goods as Party B2. The procedures in
3PL supply chains contain three steps:
1. Ownership transfers from Party A to Party C: Party A transfers the goods to
Party C after the three parties have reached an agreement of the transaction.
2. Party C’ transports the goods : Party C takes over the goods, and guarantees
the goods’ security during the transportation.
3. Ownership transfers from Party C to Party B: Party B veriﬁes the goods,
accepts them if the goods are intact, or denies the goods if the goods are not
satisfactory.
A successful transaction is ﬁnished after Party B accepts the goods. Tradition-
ally, when a party transfers goods to another party, the originality and the
quantity of the goods are checked manually. However, when RFID system is
deployed to enhance the eﬃciency of the supply chain, automatic identiﬁcation
replaces the manually checking. In RFID-enabled supply chains, the existence
of the tags indicates the existence of the original goods3.
2.2 Attacking Scenario of Adversaries
Diﬀerent with the general adversary model which only considers the external
adversaries, our adversary model for 3PL supply chain also considers the in-
ternal adversaries as well as the external adversaries. We analyze the potential
dishonest behaviors of the three parties and the disputes that may happen on
the ownership transfer between Party C and Party B as below. Note that we
2 Party A and Party B can be the same entity in some occasions, eg. a factory entrusts
a 3PL provider to transmit a batch of goods to its branch plant.
3 Suppose each tag is imbedded in or stick on one item and it is hard to separate the
tag from the item.
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Fig. 1. 3PL Supply Chain Model
suppose ownership transfer from Party A to Party C is free of disputes. The
reason is that a transaction will not begin unless Party A and Party C get into
an agreement.
– In case Party A is dishonest: Party A sends a batch of low quality goods
which do not satisfy Party B’s requirements. When Party B refuses to accept
the goods, Party A may claim that the goods are not original ones that it
delivered, they have been replaced by Party C.
– In case Party C is dishonest: In case Party C loses or damages some goods
during the transportation, to escape the compensation4, Party C then fab-
ricates the tags of the lost goods, and attaches them on fake goods. When
Party B detects the replacements, Party C may claim that the faked goods
came from Party A.
– In case Party B is dishonest: The dishonest Party B may intentionally refuse
to accept the goods by claiming that goods do not satisfy the requirements.
2.3 Security and Privacy Requirements
Against internal adversaries. The major work for RFID system in 3PL
supply chain is to facilitate Party C to transfer goods from Party A to Party B.
The system should be able to detect Party C’s malicious behavior. Inherently, we
cannot prevent Party A (Party B) from cheating Party B (Party A), however, at
least we should keep Party C away from Party A (Party B)’s malicious behavior.
The requirements of the RFID system for 3PL supply chains against internal
adversaries are listed as below:
– Restrain dishonest Party C: Party C should not be able to replace any goods
without being detected. About privacy, in 3PL supply chain, Party A and
Party B may not want to leak the goods’ information to Party C. While
the tags will be under Party C’s control, the system should protect the tags’
information leakage against Party C.
– Protecting honest Party C: If Party C honestly and successfully transfers the
goods to Party B, Party B should accept the goods unconditionally, even if
the goods do not meet the requirements, Party B should accept the goods
(then Party B negotiates with Party A without involving Party C).
4 Even worse, Party C replaces some goods and steals the original ones.
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Against external adversaries. We assume that external adversaries only con-
duct the attacks during the transportation of goods.5 The privacy and security
requirements against external adversaries are listed as below.
– Tag information privacy: It means that external adversaries cannot get the
information of the tags.
– Tag location privacy: If the responses of a tag are linkable to each other or
distinguishable from those of other tags, then the location of a tag could be
tracked by multiple collaborating tag readers. Tag location privacy means
no one except the legitimate party can trace the tags.
– Resistance of tag impersonation attack: It means that the attacker imper-
sonates a target tag without knowing the tag internal secrets and pass the
authentication of the reader.
– Resistance of replay attack: It means that the attacker reuses communica-
tions from previous sessions to perform a successful authentication between
a tag and a server.
2.4 Designing Principle
Adopting “symmetric secret”-based RFID systems in 3PL supply chains requires
the three parties to share the secrets. Considering the existence of internal ad-
versaries, sharing the secrets among three parties is problematic since having a
tag’s secret means having the ability to fabricate it. If all the three parties have
the ability to fabricate the tags, disputes on the originality of the tags is diﬃcult
to solve.
Our method is to authorize each valid party with a credential instead of the
secrets. The credential can be used by the authorized parties to check the status
of the goods. At the same time the credential should not reveal any information
about the tags. In a 3PL supply chain, Party A is the tags’ owner. Only Party A
possesses the tags’ secrets. Party A grants a credential credentialC to Party C
so that Party C can check the tags’ existing during the transportation. Party A
grants a credential credentialB to Party B, so that Party B can use it to veriﬁes
the goods. The construction and using is a subtle work.
Recalled that there are two requirements required against internal adversaries,
namely, restraining Party C and protecting Party C. Restricting Party C requires
that with credentialC , Party C cannot get any information of the tags. Protect-
ing Party C requires that Party C should be able to conﬁrm that the tags will
pass the veriﬁcation according to credentialB before taking over the goods from
Party A. Hence a systematic scheme should be designed for the three parties
to make agreement on the credentials. And considering outside adversaries, the
system should make sure that external adversaries cannot forge the tags that
pass the veriﬁcation according to the credentials.
5 The two ownership transfer happens in relative secure environments that under two
parties’ surveillance.
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The system will contain two parts: 1) designing a protocol that enable a
authorized party to verify the tags with a credential; 2) designing a scheme that
enables the three parties to make an agreement on the credentials. In this paper,
we tackle the ﬁrst part. We observe that in 3PL supply chains, normally, the
goods are checked on batch level. In the following, we provide two group checking
protocols to enable an authorized party verify the tags according to a credential
on batch level based on two diﬀerent credential designing schemes. While we
focus on the originality checking of the tags, we suppose the number of the tags
is stable, namely, if a malicious party take away one tag, he will replace it with
a fake tag.
3 Solution Based on Aggregate MAC Scheme
Our ﬁrst solution is based on an aggregate MAC scheme proposed in [7]. The
intuition of this proposal is: each tag Ti (with ki as its individual secret) is de-
ployed with a MAC function. The authorized reader is granted with a credential
that contains several couples of mj and the aggregate MAC value Agg(mj) on
mj under each tag’s key, where 1 ≤ j ≤ d, d is the number of the pairs. The
reader chooses an unused pair (m,Agg(m)), and uses m to query all the tags,
each tag replies with the MAC value on m under its key. Upon receiving all
tags’ replies, the reader aggregates them and compares the aggregated value
with Agg(m), if they are the same, then the tags are intact, else, there are not
all original ones.
3.1 Building Blocks of Our MAC-Based Solution
MAC: In cryptography, a message authentication code (MAC) is a short piece of
information used to authenticate a message. A MAC algorithm, sometimes called
a keyed (cryptographic) hash function hk(·), it accepts the inputs as a secret key
k and an arbitrary-length message m to be authenticated, and outputs a MAC
tag t = hk(m) (sometimes known as a tag). The MAC value protects both
the message’s data integrity and its authenticity by allowing veriﬁers (who also
possess the secret key) to detect any changes to the message content.
Aggregate MAC: In [7], Katz and Lindell proposed and investigated the no-
tion of aggregate message authentication codes (MACs) which has the property
that multiple MAC tags, computed by (possibly) diﬀerent senders on multi-
ple (possibly diﬀerent) messages, can be aggregated into a shorter tag that can
still be veriﬁed by a recipient who shares a distinct key with each sender. The
aggregation is done by computing XOR of all the individual MAC tags. They
proved that if the underlying MAC scheme is existentially unforgeable under an
adaptive chosen-message attack and is deterministic, then the aggregate message
authentication code generated by computing the XOR of every individual MAC
values is secure.
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3.2 Aggregate MAC-Based Solution
Requirements of the tags: The tags should be able to perform a MAC function
hk(·) under a key k stored in the tag. The tag should contain a random string
generater.
Initialization: Party A initializes the tags. Suppose there are n tags in the
system. Each tag Ti stores two secrets (b, ki), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, b is a common group
secret that is shared by all the tags, and ki is the tag Ti’s individual secret.
Authorization to a valid party: Party A keeps ki secret, and grants to a
valid party the group secret b and a credential. d denotes the estimated upper
bound of the number of times that the party will check the goods. The credential
contains d pairs of (mj , Agg(mj)), Agg(mj) =
⊕n
i=1 hki(mj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ d and
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Group checking protocol for an authorized party: For each checking, the
authorized party chooses an unused pair (mj , Agg(mj)) from the credential,
then uses mj to query all the tags. The details are depicted as below. Figure 2
illustrates the protocol.
1. Reader → Tag Ti: The reader sends mj to the tag Ti.
2. Tag Ti → Reader: On receiving mj, Ti chooses r2 ∈R {0, 1}l, l is the system
parameter. Ti computes M1 = hki(mj) ⊕ h(r2), M2 = b ⊕ r2, then sends
(M1,M2) to the reader.
3. Reader: On receiving (M1,M2), the reader computes r2 = M2 ⊕ b, and
computes ti(mj) = M1 ⊕ h(r2). The reader stores the value of ti(mj).





i=1 ti(mj) = Agg(mj), then the reader conﬁrms the existing
of the tags. If
⊕n
i=1 ti(mj) = Agg(mj), then the tags are not all the original
ones.
Party A gives credentials credentialB and credentialC respectively to Party B
and Party C. Party B uses credentialB to verify the goods when taking over
Reader R Tag Ti
[b, credential] [b, ki]
Choose an unused pair (mj , Agg(mj))
from credential. Send mj . mj
M1, M2
Choose r2 ∈R {0, 1}l,
compute M1 = hki(mj)⊕ h(r2) ,
M2 = r2 ⊕ bCompute r2 = M2 ⊕ b,
compute ti(mj) = M1 ⊕ h(r2).
After getting all the values ti(mj), the reader checks whether
⊕n
i=1 ti(mj) = Agg(mj).
Fig. 2. Aggregate MAC-Based Solution
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them from Party C. Party C uses credentialC to verifying the tags during the
transportation. In aggregate MAC-based scheme, Party B and Party C should
keep its own credential in secret to each other, and credentialB and credentialC
should not contain same (m,Agg(m)). Party C should make sure that the orig-
inal tags will pass the veriﬁcation using credentialB.
3.3 Analysis of the MAC-Based Solution
We ﬁrst analyze the security and privacy properties of the MAC-based protocol
against external adversaries.
– Tag Information Privacy: Without knowing b, the adversary cannot calculate
the value of r2. Without r2, the adversary cannot get the value of hki(mj).
Then without hki(mj), the adversary cannot get any information about ki.
– Tag location Privacy: Without common secret b and individual secret of
each tag, due to the cryptographic property of the MAC function hk(·), the
adversary cannot get any information of the tags through (M1,M2).
– Resistance of tag impersonation attack: Given (M1,M2), the adversary can-
not retrieve any information of b and ki. Without the knowledge of b and ki,
the adversary cannot retrieve any information about the tag. The probability
that the adversary successfully impersonate a tag is equal to the probability
that the adversary randomly chooses (M ′1,M ′2) and then (M ′1,M ′2) together
with other valid tags’ replies pass the veriﬁcation.
– Resistance replay attack: The authenticated reader uses fresh pair of (mj ,
Agg(mj)) to verify the tags in each checking, so that the attacker cannot
reuse the tags’ replies from previous sessions.
Then we analyze the security and privacy properties of the MAC-based protocol
against internal adversaries.
– Protect Party C: For Party C, given a tag Ti, with the common secret
b, it can challenge the tag with arbitrary message m and get the MAC tag
ti(m) = hki(m) on m with Ti’s secret ki, however it cannot compute the value
of ki if the underlying MAC scheme is secure. While without the knowledge
of ki, based on the security of the aggregate MAC scheme, it is compu-
tational impossible to forge the tags so that given another message m′, the
aggregation of the tags’ replies
⊕n
i=1 ti(m




Hence, if the tags pass the veriﬁcation using Party B’s credential, then Party
B cannot deny that the tags are original ones.
– Restrain Party C: Providing some pairs of (m,Agg(m)), together with group
secret s, Party C can verify the tags on batch level. However, given a tag
Ti, although Party C can get the value hki(m) on any message m, it cannot
compute the value ki. Hence Party C cannot obtain any extra information
of the tag.
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4 Solution Based on Aggregate Signature Scheme
Another solution is based on aggregate signature scheme proposed in [1]. Party
A authorizes the valid party with a credential that contains a value V . Each
tag Ti is considered as a signature function with key ki. Upon receiving a query
m, tag Ti replies with the signature σi(m) on m under its key. Then the reader
aggregates the individual signatures σi(m) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, veriﬁes the aggregate
signature using the value V .
4.1 Building Blocks of Our Aggregated Signature-Based Scheme
Bilinear Map: A bilinear map is a map e : G1×G2 → GT , where: (a) G1 and G2
are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order q; (b) |G1| = |G2| = |GT |6;
(c) g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2. The bilinear map e : G1×
G2 → GT satisﬁes the following properties: (a) Bilinear: for all x ∈ G1, y ∈ G2
and a, b ∈ Z, e(xa, yb) = e(x, y)ab; (b) Non-degenerate: e(g1, g2) = 1.
Short Signature Scheme: Boneh, Lynh, and Shacham proposed the short
signature scheme in [2] using the bilinear map. The system contains two groups
G1 and G2 with prime order q, a full-domain hash function H(·) : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. g is a generator of G. Each singer has
public key X = gx, where x ∈ Zq is the corresponding private key. Signing
a message M involves computing the message hash h = H(M) and then the
signature σ = hx. To verify a signature one computes h = H(M) and checks
that e(σ, g) = e(h,X).
Aggregate Signature Scheme: Aggregate signature scheme aggregates n sig-
natures on n distinct messages from n distinct users to one signature. Any one
should be able to do the aggregation without knowing the users’ keys. Boneh and
Gentry proposed a scheme [1] to aggregate BLS signatures. Given n individual
signatures, one computes the aggregate signature as follows: σ1,n =
∏n
i=1 σi, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, where σi corresponds to the user useri’s signature on message Mi. Ver-
iﬁcation of an aggregate BLS signature σ1,n includes computing the product of
all message hashes and verifying the following match: e(σ1,n, g)
?= Πni=1e(hi, Xi)
where Xi is the public key of the signer who generates σi on message Mi.
ElGamal encryption scheme: ElGamal encryption system [4] is an public
key encryption scheme based on the Diﬃe-Hellman problem. The scheme ﬁrstly
chooses a multiplicative cyclic group G of order q with generator g. Each user
useri chooses xi ∈R Zq, sets xi as the private key, then computes his public
key Xi = gxi . To encrypt a message m to useri, the sender converts his secret
message m into an element m′ of G, then chooses r ∈R Zq, computes c1 = gr
and c2 = m′ · Xri , and then sends (c1, c2) to useri. To decrypt the ciphertext
(c1, c2), useri calculates m′ = c2 · s−1 which she then converts back into the
plaintext message m.
6 G1 and G2 can be the same group.
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4.2 Basic Aggregate Signature-Based Solution
Requirements of the tags: The tags should be able to perform multiplication
and addition on a multiplicative cyclic groups G1 of prime order q. Each tag
stores a secret.
Initialization: Suppose there are n tags in a batch, each tag is denoted as
Ti, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let G1, G2 be cyclic groups of the order q. Then Party A
chooses a bilinear map: e : G1 × G1 → G2. For each tag Ti , Party A chooses
a value ki ∈R Zq as the tag’s individual secret. ki is Ti ’s individual secret.
Then Party A generates the credentials. A credential contains a value V . V is




where g is a generator of G1.
Authorization to valid party: Party A keeps the tags’ secrets and grants a
credential to a valid party as well as the system parameters.
Group checking protocol for authorized party: The details of the protocol
are shown below. Figure 3 depicts this solution.
1. Reader → Tag Ti: The reader ﬁrstly chooses a random number ri ∈R Zq,
computes mi = gri , sends mi to the tag.
2. Tag Ti → Reader : After receiving mi, Ti computes σi = mkii , then sends σi
to the reader. For each tag Ti, the reader records the reply σi.
– After getting all the tags’s replies σi, the reader checks whether
e(
∏n
i=1 σi, g) = e(g
∑ n
i=1 ri , V ). If the equation holds, the reader conﬁrms
that the tags are the original ones; else, the tags are not all original.
Reader R Tag Ti
[credential that includes V ] [ki]
Choose ri ∈R Zq,
compute mi = gri .
mi




After getting all the values σi, the reader checks whether
e(
∏n
i=1 σi, g) = e(g
∑ n
i=1 ri , V ).
Fig. 3. Basic Aggregate Signature-Based Solution
4.3 Advanced Aggregate Signature-Based Solution
The basic aggregate signature-based scheme guarantees that the authorized
party can check the tags without the secrets in batch level. However, it does
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not provide location privacy since a tag sends same reply to the same challenge
in diﬀerent sessions. To get the anti-tracing property, we randomize the tag’s
reply by using the ElGamal encryption scheme.
Requirements of the tags: Additional to the requirements in basic scheme,
teach tag Ti stores a copy of a public key S, S = gs, where s is the corresponding
private key in advance.
Initialization: The same as the basic scheme except that the credential con-
tains another value s.
Authorization to valid party: The same as the basic scheme.
Group checking protocol for authorized party: The details of the advanced
aggregate signature based scheme are shown below. Figure 4 illustrates the
proposal.
1. Reader → Tag Ti: The reader ﬁrstly chooses a random number ri ∈R Zq,
computes mi = gri , sends mi to query Ti.
2. Tag Ti → Reader : After receiving mi, Ti computes σi = mkii . Then Ti
generates a random number r2 ∈R Zq, computes M1 = σi · Sr2 , M2 =
gr2 , namely Ti encrypts σ using the ElGamal encryption scheme. Ti sends
(M1,M2) to the reader ﬁnally.
3. Reader : Receiving (M1,M2), the reader decrypts M1,M2, gets vi = M1/M s2 .
The reader records the value of σi.
– After getting all the tags’s replies σi, the reader checks whether
e(
∏n
i=1 σi, g) = e(g
∑ n
i=1 ri , V ). If the equation holds, the reader conﬁrms
that the tags are the original ones, else the tags have been replaced.
Reader R Tag Ti
[credential that contains V ,s] [ki, S]
Choose ri ∈R Zq,
compute mi = gri .
mi
M1,M2
Compute σi = mkii .
Choose r2 ∈R Zq.
Compute M1 = σi · Sr2 ,
M2 = gr2 .
Compute σi = M1/Ms2 ,
record it.
After getting all the values σi, the reader checks whether
e(
∏n
i=1 σi, g) = e(g
∑ n
i=1 ri , V ).
Fig. 4. Advanced Aggregate Signature-Based Solution
Note that diﬀerent with the aggregate MAC-Based scheme that each checking
consumes a pair of (m,Agg(m)), in aggregate signature-based scheme, the value
V is reusable. Given V , one cannot forge the tags. Hence, credentials for diﬀerent
parties include the same value V .
Protecting and Restraining the Third Party 257
4.4 Analysis of the Aggregated Signature Based Solution
We ﬁrst analyze the security and privacy properties of the advanced aggregate
signature-based protocol against external adversaries.
– Tag Information Privacy: The security of ElGamal encryption scheme guar-
antees that only the authorized reader with s can decrypt the message
(M1,M2), then get σi. For the authorized reader, with mi and σi(mi), it
is computational impossible for one to compute the value of ki based on the
hardness of Discrete Logarithm Problem. Hence our system guarantees tag
information privacy.
– Tag location Privacy: Our system provides location privacy to external ad-
versaries. Without knowing the secret s, the external adversaries cannot
distinguish the two tags because ElGamal encryption introduces randomiza-
tion.
– Resistance of tag impersonation attack: Based on the secure of the aggregate
signature scheme, without the knowledge of the tags’ keys, it is computa-
tional impossible for an adversary to forge the tags that pass the veriﬁcation
using the credential, even with the authorized parties’ public key S.
– Resistance of replay attack: The authenticated reader uses fresh message mi
to query each tag. Hence, one cannot reuse the reply (M1,M2) that contains
mi’s information as the response to another query m′i.
Then we analyze the security and privacy properties of the aggregate signature-
based protocol against internal adversaries.
– Protect Party C: The security of the aggregate signature scheme guarantees
that without the knowledge of tags’ secrets, Party C cannot forge the tags




i, g) = e(g
∑ n
i=1 ri , V ), where σ′i
corresponds to tag T ′i ’s signature on message m
′
i. Hence if the tags pass the
veriﬁcation using V , no one can claim that Party C has replaced the tags.
– Restrain Party C: Since our system achieves the tag information private
property and resist tag impersonation attack against the adversaries that do
not know the tags’ secret, Party C cannot gather any extra information of
the tags and replace any of the tags.
5 Discussions
We provide two solutions to implement the group checking for the 3PL sup-
ply chains. One is aggregate MAC (AMAC)-based, the other is aggregate
signature(AS)-based. As analyzed in Section 3 and Section 4, both the two pro-
posals meet the requirements listed in Section 2, they achieve the same security
and privacy level. In this section, we compare the two schemes’ performances
in Table 1 and their usability in Table 2. We realize the aggregate signature-
based scheme on Elliptic Curves, more details on implementing Elliptic Curve
Cryptography(ECC) on RFID chips can be found in [5]. Hence in aggregate
258 S. Cai et al.
signature-based solutions, operation · denotes point addition , operation / de-
notes point subtraction, exponential operations denotes point multiplication.
In the following tables, n denotes the number of tags in a batch. d denotes
the number of (m,Agg(m)) pairs in a credential. We ignore the cheap opera-
tions ⊕, addition, subtraction and comparison of two values on calculating the
computation consumptions on the reader side.
Table 1. Comparisons of the Two Schemes on Computation Performance
AMAC-based solution AS-based solution
Generation of a credential n · d hash operations 1 point multiplication
Computations required on tag 2 hash operations 3 point multiplications
(running the protocol) 1 point addition
Computations required on reader 1 hash operation 2 point multiplications
(running the protocol) 1 point subtraction
Computations required on reader none 2 paring operations
(Aggregation and veriﬁcation) 1 point multiplication
Table 2. Comparisons of the Two Schemes on Usability
AMAC-based solution AS-based solution
Computation capability hash function, operations on elliptic curve,
(tag) random number generator random number generator
Storage requirements 2 values 2 values
(tag)
Length of the credential O(d) O(1)
Restrictions on query only allow to use a same pre-ﬁxed allow to use arbitrary
value to query a batch of tags value to query each tag
Systematical support a scheme enables Party C to verify none
required the validity of credentialB without
knowing the contents of credentialB
From above comparisons, we can ﬁnd that the aggregate signature-based
scheme is better compared to the aggregate MAC-based scheme. The reader
can use arbitrary challenges to query the tags, while in aggregate MAC-based
scheme, the reader should use a same pre-ﬁxed value to query the whole batch
of tags. The length of a credential is constant in the aggregate signature-based
scheme while in aggregated MAC-based scheme, the length of the credential re-
lates to the number of checking granted to a party. In aggregate signature-based
scheme, credentialB and credentialC share the same value V , while in aggre-
gate MAC-based scheme, credentialB and credentialC should not contain same
(m,Agg(m)) pairs and additional scheme is required to convince Party C the
validity of credentialB without knowing the contents of credentialB.
Although aggregate signature-based scheme is more elegant, the aggregate
MAC-based scheme overall takes more advantage since it requires much
cheaper tag and performs more eﬃciently in running the protocol. Although the
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additional required systematical support will be counted on the reader side, since
the eﬃciency bottleneck of the system is on the tag side, hence the aggregate
MAC-based solution is more suitable for supply chains application.
6 Related Works
There is a concept called “grouping proof” proposed by Juels [6] which is simi-
lar with our “group checking”. The pharmaceutical distribution example is used
to illustrate how grouping proof protocols work. Yoking-proof would provide
an evidence that each container of the medication was dispensed with a leaﬂet
in case that a tag is embedded in the container and another tag is embedded
in an accompanying leaﬂet. Yoking proof only enables two tags to prove their
co-existence and is vulnerable to replay attack. Later works on grouping proof
[13,12,3,8] support multiple tags and putting their eﬀorts on improving the se-
curity and eﬃciency.
Both in the “grouping proof” scenario and “group checking” scenario, the
readers are not trusted, they do not hold the secrets of the tags. In “grouping
proof” scenario, the reader aims to prove to a veriﬁer that the tags are processed
together, in case the reader have the secrets, he can forge a proof using the keys.
In “group checking” scenario, the reader should prove the tags’ originality to
another party, in case he has the secrets, he can forge the tags. Besides reading
the tags in batch level without knowing the secrets. The two kinds of schemes
work diﬀerently. In “group proof” scenario, the reader does not need to authen-
ticate the tags. The reader only acts as a transfer stop in the grouping proof
protocols in transmitting the messages among the tags. The whole tags generate
a proof. While in “group checking” even without getting the secrets of the tags,
the reader should have the ability to check the integrity and originality of a batch
of tags. The reader interacts with the tags and veriﬁes the tags’ originality.
7 Conclusions
With the considerations of the internal adversaries as well as external adversaries,
we analyzed the security and privacy requirements of RFID system for 3PL
supply chains. We provided two “group checking” protocols to enable a reader
to check the tags’ existences and originality in batch level without knowing
the secrets of the tags. One protocol is based on aggregate MAC scheme and
the other is based on aggregate signature scheme. Both of the two protocols
achieve the goals of protecting Party C and restraining Party C, and provide
security and privacy guarantees. We compare the usability and performance of
the two schemes, we can see that the aggregate MAC-based protocol outperforms
the aggregate signature-based protocol. In the future, we will design a protocol
that enables Party C to verify the validity of credentialB without knowing the
contents of credentialB. Then the system will achieve clear ownership transfers
among the three parties.
260 S. Cai et al.
Acknowledgement. This work is partly supported by A*Star SERC Grant No.
082 101 0022 in Singapore.
References
1. Boneh, D., Gentry, C.: Aggregate and veriﬁably encrypted signatures from bilinear
maps. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, pp. 416–432.
Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
2. Boneh, D., Lynn, B., Shacham, H.: Short signatures from the weil pairing. J. Cryp-
tology 17(4), 297–319 (2004)
3. Burmester, M., de Medeiros, B., Motta, R.: Provably secure grouping-proofs for
rﬁd tags. In: Grimaud, G., Standaert, F.-X. (eds.) CARDIS 2008. LNCS, vol. 5189,
pp. 176–190. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
4. Gamal, T.E.: A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete
logarithms. In: Blakely, G.R., Chaum, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 1984. LNCS, vol. 196,
pp. 10–18. Springer, Heidelberg (1985)
5. Hein, D., Wolkerstorfer, J., Felber, N.: ECC is Ready for RFID A Proof in Silicon.
In: RFIDSec 2008, Budapest, Hungary (July 2008)
6. Juels, A.: “Yoking-Proofs” for RFID Tags. In: Sandhu, R., Thomas, R. (eds.) Per-
Sec 2004, Orlando, Florida, USA, pp. 138–143. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alami-
tos (March 2004)
7. Katz, J., Lindell, A.Y.: Aggregate message authentication codes. In: Malkin, T.G.
(ed.) CT-RSA 2008. LNCS, vol. 4964, pp. 155–169. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
8. Lin, C.C., Lai, Y.C., Tygar, J.D., Yang, C.K., Chiang, C.L.: Coexistence proof
using chain of timestamps for multiple RFID tags. In: Chang, K.C.-C., Wang, W.,
Chen, L., Ellis, C.A., Hsu, C.-H., Tsoi, A.C., Wang, H. (eds.) APWeb/WAIM 2007.
LNCS, vol. 4537, pp. 634–643. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
9. Molnar, D., Soppera, A., Wagner, D.: A Scalable, Delegatable Pseudonym Protocol
Enabling Ownership Transfer of RFID Tags. In: Preneel, B., Tavares, S. (eds.) SAC
2005. LNCS, vol. 3897, pp. 276–290. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
10. Molnar, D., Wagner, D.: Privacy and Security in Library RFID: Issues, Practices,
and Architectures. In: Pﬁtzmann, B., Liu, P. (eds.) CCS 2004, Washington, DC,
USA, pp. 210–219. ACM Press, New York (October 2004)
11. Ohkubo, M., Suzuki, K., Kinoshita, S.: Cryptographic Approach to “Privacy-
Friendly” Tags. In: RFID Privacy Workshop. MIT, Massachusetts (November 2003)
12. Piramuthu: On existence proofs for multiple rﬁd tags. In: PERSER 2006, Wash-
ington, DC, USA, pp. 317–320. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2006)
13. Saito, J., Sakurai, K.: Grouping proof for rﬁd tags. In: AINA 2005, Washington,
DC, USA, pp. 621–624. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2005)
14. Song, B.: RFID Tag Ownership Transfer. In: RFIDsec 2008, Budaperst, Hungary
(July 2008)
15. Weis, S.A., Sarma, S.E., Rivest, R.L., Engels, D.W.: Security and Privacy As-
pects of Low-Cost Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation Systems. In: Hutter, D., Mu¨ller,
G., Stephan, W., Ullmann, M. (eds.) Security in Pervasive Computing. LNCS,
vol. 2802, pp. 201–212. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Author Index
Amini, Morteza 186
Becker, Moritz Y. 125
Bhattacharya, Amiya 66
Birgisson, Arnar 48





















Louw, Mike Ter 3
Malkis, Alexander 125
Mao, Bing 140















Van Acker, Steven 156
Venkatakrishnan, V.N. 3, 96






Zhou, Michelle 3, 96
